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The most important single element of the “ground system” portion of a Mars Sample 
Return (MSR) Campaign is a facility referred to as the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF), 
which would need to be designed and equipped to receive the returned spacecraft, extract 
and open the sealed sample container, extract the samples from the sample tubes, and 
implement a set of evaluations and analyses of the samples. 
One of the main findings of the first MSR Sample Planning Group (MSPG, 2019a) states 
that “The scientific community, for reasons of scientific quality, cost, and timeliness, 
strongly prefers that as many sample-related investigations as possible be performed in PI-
led laboratories outside containment.” There are many scientific and technical reasons for 
this preference, including the ability to utilize advanced and customized instrumentation 
that may be difficult to reproduce inside in a biocontained facility, and the ability to allow 
multiple science investigators in different labs to perform similar or complementary 
analyses to confirm the reproducibility and accuracy of results. It is also reasonable to 
assume that there will be a desire for the SRF to be as efficient and economical as possible, 
while still enabling the objectives of MSR to be achieved. 
For these reasons, MSPG concluded, and MSPG2 agrees, that the SRF should be 
designed to accommodate only those analytical activities that could not reasonably be 
done in outside laboratories because they are time- or sterilization-sensitive, are necessary 
for the Sample Safety Assessment Protocol (SSAP), or are necessary parts of the initial 
sample characterization process that would allow subsamples to be effectively allocated 
for investigation. All of this must be accommodated in an SRF, while preserving the 
scientific value of the samples through maintenance of strict environmental and 
contamination control standards. 
Executive Summary 
The most important single element of the “ground system” portion of a Mars Sample 
Return (MSR) Campaign is a facility referred to as the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF), 
which would need to be designed and equipped to enable receipt of the returned 
spacecraft, extraction and opening of the sealed sample container, extraction of the 
































































































































































































































































































































samples from the sample tubes, and a set of evaluations and analyses of the samples—all 
under strict protocols of biocontainment and contamination control. Some of the 
important constraints in the areas of cost and required performance have not yet been set 
by the necessary governmental sponsors, but it is reasonable to assume there will be a 
desire for the SRF to be as efficient and economical as is possible, while still enabling the 
objectives of MSR science to be achieved. Additionally, one of the main findings of MSR 
Sample Planning Group (MSPG, 2019a) states “The scientific community, for reasons of 
scientific quality, cost, and timeliness, strongly prefers that as many sample-related 
investigations as possible be performed in PI-led laboratories outside containment.” There 
are many scientific and technical reasons for this preference, including the ability to utilize 
advanced and customized instrumentation that may be difficult to reproduce inside a 
biocontained facility. Another benefit is the ability to enable similar or complementary 
analyses by multiple science investigators in different laboratories, which would confirm 
the reproducibility and accuracy of results. 
For these reasons, the MSPG concluded—and the MSR Science Planning Group Phase 2 
(MSPG2) agrees—that the SRF should be designed to accommodate only those analytical 
activities inside biocontainment that could not reasonably be done in outside laboratories 
because such activities are time-sensitive, sterilization-sensitive, required by the Sample 
Safety Assessment Protocol (SSAP), or are necessary parts of the initial sample 
characterization process that would allow subsamples to be effectively allocated for 
investigation. All activities within the SRF must be done while preserving the scientific 
value of the samples through maintenance of strict environmental and contamination 
control standards. 
The SRF would need to provide a unique environment that consists of both Biosafety 
Level 4 (BSL-4) equivalent containment and a very high level of contamination control. The 
SRF would also need to accommodate the following activities: 
(1) Receipt of the returned spacecraft, presumably in a sealed shipping container 
  
































































































































































































































































































































(2) De-integration (i.e., disassembly) and assessment of the returned system, 
beginning with the spacecraft exterior and ending with accessing and isolating all 
Mars material (gas, dust, regolith, and rock) 
(3) Initial sample characterization, leading to development of a sample catalog 
sufficient to support sample allocation (see Tait et al., 2021) 
(4) Science investigations necessary to complete the SSAP (see Kminek et al., 2021) 
(5) Certain science investigations that are both time- and sterilization-sensitive (see 
Tosca et al., 2021; Velbel et al., 2021) 
(6) A managed transition to post-SRF activities that would include analysis of samples 
(either sterilized or not) outside biocontainment and the transfer of some or all 
samples to one or more uncontained curation facilities 
The MSPG2 has produced a compilation of potential design requirements for the SRF, 
based on the list of activities noted above, that can be used in cost and schedule planning. 
The text of this report is meant to serve as an overview and explanation of these proposed 
SRF Design Requirements that have been compiled by the MSPG2 SRF Requirements Focus 
Group (Supplement 1). 
Summary of Findings 
FINDING SRF-1: The quality of the science that can be achieved with the MSR samples 
will be negatively impacted if they are not protected from contamination and 
inappropriate environmental conditions. A significant amount of SRF infrastructure would 
therefore be necessary to maintain and monitor appropriate levels of cleanliness, 
contamination control, and environmental conditions. 
FINDING SRF-2: Although most MSR sample investigations would take place outside of 
the SRF, the SRF needs to include significant laboratory capabilities with advanced 
instruments and associated sample preparation systems to enable the MSR science 
objectives to be successfully achieved. 
FINDING SRF-3: Preliminary studies of different operational scenarios should be 
started as soon as possible to enable analysis of the trade-offs between the cost and size 
































































































































































































































































































































of the SRF and the amount of time needed to prepare the samples for allocation and 
analysis. 
FINDING SRF-4: The ability to add additional analytical capabilities within 
biocontainment should be preserved to address the contingency scenario in which 
unsterilized material is not cleared to be analyzed outside of biocontainment. If potential 
evidence of martian life were to be detected in the samples, for example, it would be a 
high priority to conduct further investigations related to any putative lifeforms, as well as 
to enable other sterilization-sensitive science investigations to be conducted in 
biocontainment. 
  


































































































































































































































































































































In 2018, NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) signed a joint Statement of Intent 
to continue defining respective roles and responsibilities in the flight missions required to 
realize MSR. In October 2020, NASA and ESA formalized this partnership with the signature 
of a Memorandum of Understanding for the MSR flight missions. The returned samples 
would be carefully managed and made available to the international community for 
scientific investigation. The current baseline architecture for the MSR Campaign consists of 
the following: (i) NASA’s Mars 2020 Perseverance rover (currently in operation on Mars), 
which will collect and encapsulate samples, (ii) two joint ESA-NASA flight missions that are 
intended to retrieve the samples from Mars and return them to Earth (both in 
development as of this writing), and (iii) the ground-based systems needed to receive and 
process the samples once they arrive on Earth. The MSR flight missions represent one of 
the most complex undertakings that NASA and ESA have ever attempted and are hereafter 
collectively referred to as the “MSR Program.” 
The planning for what would happen to the samples when they arrive on Earth is 
comparably complex, although for different reasons. The most important single element of 
the “ground system” is a facility referred to as the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF), where 
the returned spacecraft would be opened and the sealed sample container removed to 
access the samples. The individual sample tubes would be examined before being opened, 
followed by extraction and evaluation of the samples through a series of analytical 
procedures. Each of the steps would be carried out under strict protocols of 
biocontainment and environmental and contamination control. 
In response to the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the MSPG2 activity chartered by NASA 
and ESA in March 2020 (MSPG2 ToR, Meyer et al., 2021), this report addresses Deliverable 
#3: “Develop approaches and a working list of high-level requirements for the SRF that can 
be used in cost estimation and budgeting. The requirements specifically need to represent 
the needs and interests of each of science, curation, and planetary protection. All 
proposed requirements need a justification statement.” This report, which represents our 
response to this request in the form of a narrative, explains assumptions, strategies, 
































































































































































































































































































































relationships, etc. and provides a table of proposed requirements (Supplement 1). Note 
that as we built the list of proposed requirements we chose to limit our scope to SRF 
design requirements, which would affect cost and schedule, rather than operating 
requirements. The latter will need further work by a successor planning group. 
Our report is a direct extension of three companion reports prepared concurrently by 
MSPG2 over the past nine months, which analyze three technical areas that would need to 
be managed as part the work in the SRF as follows: sample curation, time-sensitive 
science, and the effects of sample sterilization. It is the authors’ intent that this report 
compiles all of the requirements mentioned in the other documents, as well as some 
derived from elsewhere. 
 Previous work and context of SRF planning 1.2
1.2.1 1990s 
A number of reports from studies and workshops during the 1990s established the 
context for SRF design and implementation. IMEWG (the International Mars Exploration 
Working Group) was established in 1993 to ensure that planning for Mars exploration 
(including sample return) was coordinated across different space agencies, encouraging 
inter-agency co-operation. In 1995, NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to 
conduct a study pertaining to sample return that addressed key issues associated with the 
potential risks to Earth from samples returned from Solar System bodies such as Mars. The 
NRC panel focused principally on Mars, producing a report (National Research Council, 
1997) that became a cornerstone for much of the planetary protection-related work of the 
MSR ’03–’05 Project. In addition, the NASA Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel 
(MSHARP) made recommendations (Carr et al., 1999) with regard to certification of 
returned samples as non-hazardous and considerations associated with sample receiving, 
curation, and distribution. MSHARP recommended that the samples be treated as 
hazardous until proven otherwise, which is consistent with NRC (1997). 
1.2.2 ’03/’05 MSR and the introduction to MRSH, 1999–2004 
The first in-depth discussion of facility planning for an MSR-related Sample Receiving 
Facility was carried out in connection with planning for the MSR ’03–’05 Project. This 
































































































































































































































































































































version of MSR advanced as far as Preliminary Design Review (PDR) before it was cancelled 
in 2000. Regarding SRF planning, a workshop was held in February 1999 at Caltech called 
the Mars Sample Handling, Distribution, and Analysis Workshop (D. McCleese and M. 
Drake, Chairs) that introduced the term “Mars Receiving Facility.” This facility concept was 
renamed later that year to the more generic “Sample Receiving Facility” (or SRF) by NASA’s 
newly formed Mars Returned Sample Handling (MRSH) team because of the possibility 
that such a facility might be used in the future for samples originating from planetary 
objects other than Mars. Other synonymous terms used at that time were “Sample 
Handling Facility” (SHF) and “Mars Handling Facility” (MHF), but these were discarded 
because of unfavorable connotations around the word “Handling.” 
Concurrent with this work was a very important set of activities led by John Rummel 
and several colleagues to develop a first draft of the Planetary Protection test protocol. 
This led to the publication of several workshop reports, and a summary roll-up document 
(Rummel et al., 2002). This activity touched on the measurements needed in the SRF to 
assess sample safety as well as general concepts for the organization and management of 
the SRF. 
At the end of the ’03/’05 Project, NASA recognized that, if an MSR project were 
restarted in the future, it would have to include realistic planning parameters for the SRF, 
including cost, schedule, and size. Therefore, planning activity for the SRF continued 
through 2004, several years beyond the cancellation of the flight mission. The MRSH team 
(key members included David Beaty, David Lindstrom, Dimitri Papanastassiou, and Carlton 
Allen) made some valuable advancements in understanding approximate cost, schedule, 
technology needs, and relationship to the flight program. A major aspect of this planning 
was a set of three independently completed industry studies that were carried out in 
2003–2004, the engineering of which was led by Richard Mattingly, Jim Campbell, and 
Frank Jordan. These studies formed the basis for a much clearer understanding of the 
possible requirements, design, cost, timeline, and operational considerations for an MSR-
related SRF, and a summary of these studies was published by Beaty et al. (2009). 
  
































































































































































































































































































































Because the earlier reports provided advice at a fairly general level, the NRC followed 
up with a study of the criteria for release of samples from biocontainment in an SRF 
(National Research Council, 2002). Of relevance to the present study, the report 
recommended that only the most basic operations be conducted inside the facility, and it 
should be designed to the smallest and simplest possible scale consistent with its dual 
roles as a biological containment and cleanroom facility, with detailed protocols and 
procedures for handling and testing Mars samples. 
1.2.3 Inter-agency planning, 2005–2017 
The international Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples Working Group (iMARS 
WG), which was active in 2007–2008 under the sponsorship of the International Mars 
Exploration Working Group (IMEWG), represented a concentrated effort to 
internationalize MSR (Beaty et al., 2008). Although much of their activity focused on the 
flight systems, one of their working groups evaluated management of the samples after 
they returned to Earth, and in a general sense, the functionality of the SRF. They proposed 
that the samples be managed by an international institute, for which they applied the 
conceptual acronym IMSI (International MSR Science Institute). CERN (The European 
Organization for Nuclear Research) and STSI (Space Telescope Science Institute) were 
identified as potentially analogous institutes. iMARS Phase 2 (iMARS-2) was then 
subsequently tasked with evaluating the IMSI concept, and they proposed some initial 
concepts for the management of MSR science, including the SRF (Haltigin et al., 2018). 
In 2009, the Visions & Voyages Planetary Science Decadal Survey stated that the 
highest priority flagship mission for 2013–2022 should be a Mars sample-collecting rover 
that would represent the first step in a joint NASA-ESA MSR Campaign (National Research 
Council, 2011). This led to the development, launch, and subsequent successful landing of 
the Mars 2020 Perseverance rover in 2021. The MSR End-to-End International Science 
Analysis Group (E2E-iSAG) was formed to ensure that the sample collection by Mars 2020 
was properly planned in the larger context of MSR science. This group consolidated and 
prioritized the overarching science aims and objectives for the MSR campaign, and made 
recommendations for the types, number, and character of samples needed to achieve the 
MSR science objectives (McLennan et al.,2012). The recommendations of E2E-iSAG were 
































































































































































































































































































































used to inform the design of the Mars 2020 rover and its sampling system, as well as the 
selection of its instrument suite. The international MSR Objectives and Samples Team 
(iMOST) was chartered in 2017 to refine the science objectives for MSR and determine 
what types of measurements would need to be made to achieve those objectives (Beaty et 
al., 2019). These reports served as the starting point for many of the discussions of MSPG 
and MSPG2. 
1.2.4 MSR Science Planning Group (MSPG, MSPG2), 2018–2021 
In 2018–19, the ESA- and NASA-chartered MSR Science Planning Group (MSPG) 
developed an updated set of science-related strategies to guide SRF planning (MSPG, 2019a, 
b). This planning incorporated all of the prior planning work listed above and, in particular, 
made use of some of the concepts developed by iMARS-2. These strategies better reflected 
current NASA, ESA, and community attitudes and priorities relating to the SRF. 
 SRF objectives and assumptions 1.3
The proposed design requirements for the SRF (Supplement 1) have been developed 
based on the following lists of objectives and assumptions. To maximize the scientific 
output of the samples and minimize the cost and size of the SRF, this list and the resulting 
proposed requirements were written with the intent that as many analyses as possible 
should be conducted outside the SRF, either on sterilized samples or after the samples 
have been determined to be safe for release. 
1.3.1 SRF objectives 
The SRF would need to provide a unique environment that would consist of both BSL-4 
equivalent containment (Section 3.1) and a very high level of contamination control 
(Section 2.1), and it would need to accommodate the following activities: 
(1) Receipt of the returned spacecraft, presumably in a sealed shipping container 
(Section 3.2) 
(2) De-integration (i.e., disassembly) and assessment of the returned system, 
beginning from the spacecraft exterior and ending with accessing and isolating all 
Mars material (gas, dust, regolith, and rock) (Section 3.2) 
































































































































































































































































































































(3) Initial sample characterization, leading to development of a sample catalog 
sufficient to support sample allocation (see Tait et al., 2021; Section 2.2.1 of this 
report) 
(4) Science investigations necessary to complete the Sample Safety Assessment 
Protocol (see Kminek et al., 2021; Section 2.2.4 of this report) 
(5) Certain science investigations that are both time- and sterilization-sensitive (see 
Tosca et al., 2021 and Velbel et al., 2021; Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of this report) 
(6) A managed transition to post-SRF activities, including analysis of samples (either 
sterilized or not) outside biocontainment, and the transfer of some or all samples 
to one or more uncontained curation facilities (Sections 2.2.5, 3.3, 3.4) 
1.3.2 Assumptions 
(1) The landing site of the MSR Earth Entry System (EES) would be in the U.S., and one 
SRF would also be located in the U.S. (MSPG2 ToR, Meyer et al., 2021). The 
possibility of a second biocontained sample facility in Europe exists but is not 
addressed here, because the potential existence of a second biocontained facility is 
not expected to impact the necessary functionalities for the primary SRF. 
(2) A primary purpose of the SRF would be to preserve the scientific value of the 
samples, which will necessitate requirements related to environmental and 
contamination control. 
(3) The SRF would be a tailored facility—sufficiently capable to achieve the objectives 
stated above. All other measurements should be planned to take place outside 
biocontainment on samples that have been sterilized or have been determined not 
to contain biohazardous material. 
(4) One of the primary MSPG findings states that “The scientific community, for 
reasons of scientific quality, cost, and timeliness, strongly prefers that as many 
sample-related investigations as possible be performed in PI-led laboratories 
outside containment.” A direct implication is that scientific investigations that can 
tolerate sterilization should be done outside biocontainment (MSPG, 2019a). 
































































































































































































































































































































(5) In addition to planetary protection-, science-, and curation-driven requirements, 
the SRF would also have requirements related to building engineering, 
infrastructure, physical security, and other traditional facilities-related 
requirements. 
 Technical notes 1.4
Capabilities related to curation (including initial sample characterization), sterilization-
sensitive measurements, and time-sensitive measurements, all of which are necessary to 
complete the Sample Safety Assessment Protocol (SSAP), are outlined in Section 2. The 
reports on these activities by their respective MSPG2 Focus Groups provide a higher level 
of detail with regard to their findings and reasoning (Tait et al., 2021; Tosca et al., 2021; 
Velbel et al., 2021). 
Section 3 is a compilation of objectives and functionalities for the SRF that have been 
formulated over the past two decades, which include the need for BSL-4 equivalent 
containment and to meet all requirements related to planetary protection, overall building 
engineering functions, and spacecraft receiving and de-integration capabilities. We note 
the following about the approach taken to develop the proposed SRF Design Requirements 
table given in Supplement 1: 
(1) We limited our analysis to requirements that relate to facility design and not to its 
operation. Analysis of operational requirements, including procedures, personnel 
functionalities and relationships, training, etc., should be the focus of a future report. 
(2) As was noted by Mattingly et al. (2020), there are several ways for facilities of this 
general type to be configured, and we would like to allow and encourage the 
blending of best practices for this unique facility. For this reason, we have defined 
the proposed requirements in terms of necessary capabilities and are not 
advocating for specific implementations. An exception, however, is that to convey a 
better understanding of the instruments that may need to be accommodated in 
the SRF, we have named what we are calling “reference instruments.” Our 
definition of this term, and how we have used it, is treated below in the 
introduction to Section 2.2. 
































































































































































































































































































































(3) We have used a hierarchical requirements structure that begins with Level 1 (L1) at 
the most general. We consider our analysis of the L1 requirements to be 
reasonably complete, but for L2 and L3 we have strived to collect the requirements 
that might affect overall facility cost and schedule and deliberately did not strive 
for completeness (future follow up work is needed). Some of the requirements at 
L2 and L3 effectively serve as placeholder requirements, where the values will need 
to be filled in by a future group. For example, we know there will be a numerical 
value for allowable organic contamination, or rate of contamination, but the details 
of a contamination control and knowledge plan have been deferred to a future 
planning group. More details on the areas identified for future work can be found 
in Section 5 of this report. 
More information on the format and structure of the proposed requirements list is 
presented in Supplement 1. 
2. Core Science and Curation Functionalities 
 Preserving the scientific value of the samples 2.1
As expressed in Assumption #2 (Section 1.3.2), one of the primary purposes of the SRF 
must be to preserve the scientific value of the returned samples. The quality of the science 
that can be achieved by analyzing the samples is highly dependent on protecting them 
from alteration or degradation caused by inappropriate environmental storage conditions 
and terrestrial contamination. The Mars 2020 Project has numerous requirements related 
to limiting contamination and maintaining sample quality during collection of material on 
Mars (Boeder and Soares, 2020). These requirements were established to ensure that 
study and analysis of the MSR samples would address the planned scientific objectives 
within the necessary constraints of mission design and cost (Beaty et al., 2014; Carrier et 
al., 2017; Liu et al., 2014a,b). Some of these standards were formulated for the Mars 2020 
Project by the Returned Sample Science Board (RSSB), a group chartered in mid-2015 by 
NASA to represent the sample scientific community who will study the returned samples, 
while others were formulated by predecessors of the RSSB (Beaty et al., 2014; RSSB 
2016a,b; 2018a,b). 
































































































































































































































































































































The set of requirements specifically aimed at preserving the scientific integrity of the 
samples once they have returned to Earth parallels those designed to protect sample 
scientific integrity while the samples are transported to Earth. Some of the requirements 
for samples returned to Earth differ depending on the environment in which the samples 
are processed (e.g., in an isolator vs. in a laboratory environment). The requirements fall 
into two general categories: 
(1) The capability to control and provide knowledge of environmental conditions to 
which the MSR samples are exposed; 
(2) The capability to limit sample contamination (e.g., organic, inorganic, particulate, 
biological) to within acceptable limits and provide knowledge and documentation 
of the contamination. 
To meet these requirements, the SRF would need the capability to precision clean large 
and small pieces of equipment, and to control and monitor various environmental 
conditions and contamination levels in real time. 
2.1.1 Environmental conditions 
To limit sample alteration and degradation, samples and subsamples should be stored 
and processed in controlled environments. This includes temperature and the composition 
and humidity of the atmospheric gas in isolators or storage containers. It also requires 
avoidance of exposure of the samples to magnetic fields that could interfere with 
measurement of magnetic properties of the samples. 
With regard to temperature, the intention is to operate the SRF and store and process 
samples at 15–25oC (Tait et al., 2021). There may be an exception for select sample splits if 
they are believed to contain evidence of martian biology or other properties that would 
warrant storage at colder temperatures (i.e., -20ºC) to further limit degradation until 
additional analysis can be done (Tosca et al., 2021). The proposed SRF Design 
Requirements table also includes requirements related to maintaining high-purity inert gas 
atmosphere inside the sample containers and isolators and to limiting humidity in 
isolators, storage containers, and laboratories. The actual allowable humidity values and  
 
































































































































































































































































































































planning for what type of gas environment under which to store and process samples will 
be defined by a future planning group. 
To verify that the environmental standards are maintained, monitoring sensors and 
other equipment would be needed throughout areas in which samples are processed and 
analyzed. The full description of these monitoring systems is outside the scope of this 
report but should be part of the detailed facility design process. 
2.1.2  Contamination control 
There are multiple types of contamination that are of concern for MSR samples. These 
include organic, inorganic, biological, and particulate contamination, all of which would 
need to be strictly controlled and monitored. MSPG has proposed using the M2020 
requirements (MSPG, 2019b and references in Section 2.1 of this report) for limiting 
contamination by viable organisms, as well as organic and inorganic contamination, as a 
starting point in developing contamination requirements for the SRF, but the details of 
these requirements will need to be refined by a future planning group. Contamination 
control requirements will apply at all stages subsequent to initial receipt of the spacecraft. 
Figure 1 shows qualitatively those phases of the workflow that are expected to have the 
most stringent contamination control requirements. 
To maintain and monitor appropriate levels of cleanliness, the SRF must include the 
infrastructure and capabilities to perform precision cleaning and final cleaning of 
laboratory spaces, instruments, gloveboxes, and isolators, as well as smaller equipment 
and tools that would come into contact with the samples. This would require the capability 
to sterilize equipment and tools and provide ultrapure water generation infrastructure for 
the cleaning facilities as well as the sample preparation laboratories. The capabilities 
would be needed to monitor airflow as well as particulate, inorganic, organic, and 
microbial contamination within air filtration systems, labs, gloveboxes, and isolators. The 
full description of these monitoring systems is outside the scope of this report but will 
need to be part of the detailed facility design process. 
 
































































































































































































































































































































FINDING SRF-1: The quality of the science that can be achieved with the MSR samples will 
be negatively impacted if they are not protected from contamination and inappropriate 
environmental conditions. A significant amount of SRF infrastructure would therefore be 
necessary to maintain and monitor appropriate levels of cleanliness, contamination 
control, and environmental conditions. 
 Analytical capabilities 2.2
As noted above, MSPG2 has drafted the proposed SRF Design Requirements in terms 
of required capabilities, leaving implementation options open rather than dictating specific 
instrumentation. For example, a required capability might be the necessity to determine 
the mineralogy of a sample at high spatial resolution, which could be met through use of a 
Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FT-IR), or 
Raman spectroscopy. 
To convey a better understanding of the number and type of instruments that may 
need to be accommodated in the SRF, each of the three Focus Groups also drafted 
traceability matrices to correlate their specific analysis goals with the types of instruments 
that would be necessary and sufficient to meet those goals (Tait et al., 2021; Tosca et al., 
2021; Velbel et al., 2021). Knowledge of these potential instrument types allowed MSPG2 
to consider overlap between capabilities needed for different objectives and led to the 
naming of “reference instruments.” These instruments have been compiled in 
Supplements 2 and 3 and are intended to be used for planning and discussion purposes 
only. It is expected that a future group will draft more specific instrument-level 
performance requirements, and these would be used to conduct a competitive 
procurement process. 
2.2.1 Curation: Initial sample characterization 
Curation is defined here as a set of activities whose main purpose is to preserve the 
scientific value of a sample collection, while enabling it to be used efficiently by the 
community seeking to realize the MSR Campaign science objectives. To fulfill this purpose, 
it is important to achieve a sufficient understanding of the samples and share that 
understanding with the community through a sample catalog. This ensures that the 
































































































































































































































































































































allocation of subsamples can be optimized for the scientific investigations for which they 
are intended to be used. A sample catalog would include all data and metadata linked to 
the samples. 
The report from the Curation Focus Group (Tait et al., 2021) also describes in detail the 
initial sample characterization processes required to produce the sample catalog. Figure 2 
shows the expected workflow for this characterization, and Table 1 summarizes the 
various activities considered in the work of Tait et al. (2021). 
2.2.1.1 Implications for SRF capabilities 
Tait et al. (2021) produced a traceability matrix that summarizes the goals of the 
curation activities taking place inside the SRF to complete the initial sample 
characterization, with corresponding measurements and reference instruments that would 
be sufficient to carry out those activities. The primary goals are as follows:  
(1) Understand the state of the samples prior to tube opening 
(2) Initiate an inventory and tracking of the samples (including grain size, 
density/porosity, lithology assessment) 
(3) Carry out a preliminary assessment of lithology and any macroscopic forms of 
heterogeneity 
(4) Understand sufficiently the essential attributes of each sample so that a sample 
catalog can be prepared and appropriate samples distributed; distribution of 
samples would be subject to governance guidelines 
The traceability matrix and the reference instrument types, which have been incorporated 
into the integrated instrument list, can be viewed in Supplement 2 of this report. 
To carry out the curatorial activities described in the previous section, an array of 
sample preparation and manipulation techniques is needed. All of these activities are 
expected to take place under biocontainment, while respecting the environmental and 
contamination requirements described in Section 2.1 and limiting cross contamination 
between samples. It is recommended that all of these activities should be recorded 
through photos, videos, and notes. 
































































































































































































































































































































Before the sample tubes are opened, a dust removing station will be needed. It will be 
important to recover all dust from the outside of the sample tubes for further investigation 
(Grady et al., 2021). It would also be necessary to check the quality of the sample tube 
seals, make measurements of the sample magnetic properties, and conduct penetrative 
imaging at this stage. 
The subsequent Basic Characterization (BC) steps should be done in a pristine isolator 
to ensure sample integrity and prevent contamination. A pristine isolator is a clean 
controlled container (isolator/glovebox/isolation chamber) with a controlled atmosphere 
where BC will take place. The main difference between a pristine container and non-
pristine container or environment is that the pristine container allows for a highly 
restrictive list of allowed materials. Once a sample is removed from its pristine container, it 
would not be allowed back into a pristine container. Both pristine and non-pristine sample 
containers and environments will have strict contamination control requirements. 
To avoid cross contamination between samples and activities, dedicated isolators 
should be used and cleaned between samples. Tait et al. (2021) proposed that the number 
of pristine isolators needed for BC is at least twelve (see Tait et al., 2021, Section 4.2 for 
full discussion). The number of pristine isolators is expected to have a direct correlation 
with the necessary size of the facility and the speed at which the sample catalog can be 
prepared. 
To limit contamination while samples are in pristine isolators, techniques will be 
confined to subsampling with tools of accepted materials with limited sawing capacity. For 
the PE phase, more extensive sample preparation techniques would be required, for 
example, production of polished sections. These activities should occur in a controlled 
environment, though with less stringent requirements than those required for BC. The 
final contamination control requirements and contamination control and knowledge plan 
should be developed by a future planning group. 
2.2.2 Time-sensitive measurements 
Based on the work of Tait et al. (2021), as described in Section 2.2.1 of this report, it is 
clear that extracting the samples from the returned spacecraft, performing a preliminary 
































































































































































































































































































































examination, completing the SSAP, and producing sample splits for sample allocation is 
likely to take several months per sample, and perhaps 2 years (or more?) before all of the 
samples could be made available to be allocated to existing research labs. This raises an 
important issue: some of the scientific attributes of the Mars samples will degrade with 
time, beginning at the point that the seals on the sample tubes are penetrated and the 
samples are no longer in equilibrium with martian headspace gas (Figure 3). 
Analysis of these concerns (Tosca et al., 2021) has shown that there are several 
important investigations where the sample attribute of interest to science is significantly 
degraded within a time scale of weeks to months. The most important degradation effects 
are as follows: 
(1) Degradation of organic material (including volatile hydrocarbons) 
(2) Modification of sample headspace gas composition 
(3) Mineral-volatile exchange (including hydrous sulfate minerals, poorly crystalline 
and X-ray amorphous materials, phyllosilicate minerals, and hydrous carbonate 
minerals) 
(4) Oxidation / reduction of redox-sensitive elements in diverse host phases 
MSPG (2019a) and Tosca et al. (2021) strongly recommend that the analytic 
capabilities needed to carry out time-sensitive scientific investigations are placed within 
the SRF so that those sample measurements can be expedited as part of the early work 
flow. This is especially important for attributes that degrade on a time scale of weeks to a 
few months. These are properties that will need to be measured quickly or the opportunity 
to make such measurements may be irretrievably lost. There are additional investigations 
that have time sensitivities with a time scale of multiple months to years, though it should 
be possible to expedite the work flows so those studies can be performed outside the SRF. 
Conversely, measuring sample attributes that degrade on a time scale of minutes/hours/a 
few days (some of which have been identified by Tosca et al., 2021) may be difficult to 
implement. It is important to note that all the investigations that have been determined by 
Tosca et al. (2021) to be time-sensitive involve measurement of sample properties that  
 
































































































































































































































































































































have also been determined to be sterilization-sensitive, and thus quickly sterilizing sample 
splits and doing these analyses outside the SRF is not an option. 
2.2.2.1 Implications for SRF capabilities 
In response to the above considerations, Tosca et al. (2021) presented the following 
four goals for sample analysis inside the SRF: 
(1) Characterize sample tube headspace gas composition; 
(2) Characterize organic matter of potential biological origin (including volatile 
hydrocarbons); 
(3) Characterize mineral-bound volatiles; 
(4) Characterize solid-phase volatile hosts. 
Tosca et al. (2021) also produced a traceability matrix that summarizes the goals of 
time-sensitive activities needed inside the SRF, with corresponding measurements and 
reference instruments that would be sufficient to carry out those activities. The 
traceability matrix and the reference instrument types, which have been incorporated into 
the integrated instrument list, can be viewed in Supplement 2 of this report. 
There are several other recommendations for capabilities needed within the SRF to 
support measurement of time-sensitive sample attributes: 
(1) The SRF should have the capacity to store subsamples in hermetically sealed 
containers at sub-zero temperatures if (1) evidence of martian biology or (2) 
volatile hydrocarbons and/or reactive O-containing species are detected to prevent 
further degradation of these components, which can occur at ambient 
temperatures. 
(2) Sample tubes should be placed in a secondary container as soon as is feasible. The 
headspace of this secondary container should be subject to periodic monitoring of 
gaseous species to ensure that the sample tube seals have not been breached and 
the samples have not continued to outgas. This should include, for example, 
headspace composition via optical methods (e.g., tunable laser spectroscopy—TLS). 
































































































































































































































































































































(3) The headspace gas present in a sample tube selected for analysis should be 
retrieved and characterized compositionally (e.g., using TLS) as soon as is feasible 
after the seal of the collection container is breached. The retrieval process should 
recover all available gas originally contained within one individual sample tube 
volume. 
2.2.3 Sterilization-sensitive measurements 
Although the probability of finding extant martian life in the MSR samples from the 
surface of Mars is extremely low (Carrier et al., 2020; National Research Council, 1997; 
Rummel et al., 2014), one of the guiding principles of MSR will be to keep the samples 
under BSL-4 (or BSL-4 equivalent) containment until the samples have either been deemed 
safe for release through completion of the SSAP or through sterilization. For 
measurements that can be made effectively on sterilized samples, there is no need to 
consider accommodating those measurements inside the SRF, as sample splits can be 
sterilized and released from the SRF for analysis relatively quickly. In fact, as discussed by 
the first MSR Science Planning Group (MSPG, 2019a), it is preferable to plan for as many 
scientific investigations as possible outside the SRF in specialized laboratories. This course 
of action is preferable both in terms of limiting the cost of the SRF as well as for scientific 
reasons, such as access to specialized instruments and the capability to verify the 
reproducibility of results by using multiple instruments or techniques. and having those 
measurements made in different laboratories. For sample attributes that may be damaged 
via the sterilization process (i.e., sterilization-sensitive attributes), it would be necessary to 
plan for analysis of those attributes inside biocontainment or assume that the analyses can 
be done at a later date after the samples have (presumably) been determined to be non-
hazardous (Figure 4). 
The first step in determining which investigations might need to take place inside the 
SRF is to determine those sample attributes that are sterilization-sensitive. MSPG2’s 
Sterilization-Effects Focus Group was asked to evaluate the implications of two sterilization 
techniques on various sample attributes of interest to MSR science (Velbel et al., 2021). 
  

































































































































































































































































































































(1) Sterilization by Dry-Heat: 
(a) 180°C for 3 hours 
(b) 250°C for 30 min 
(2) Sterilization by exposure to gamma (γ) irradiation: 
(a) 1 MGy (100 Mrad) 
Velbel et al. (2021) divided their analysis into four categories and determined which 
measurements relevant to each those categories were sterilization-sensitive, with the 
following conclusions: 
(1) Extant or recent martian life: Studies of extant life (either indigenous or 
contaminants, viable or dead cells) cannot credibly be done on samples that have 
been sterilized by any means. It is a very high priority that these experiments be 
done on unsterilized samples inside biocontainment. 
(2) Biosignatures of past martian life: Many investigations of potential biosignatures, 
particularly organic molecular biosignatures, would be severely compromised by 
either heat or gamma irradiation sterilization techniques. These investigations 
would need to be done on unsterilized samples inside biocontainment, although 
there may be alternative sterilization techniques that would allow some of the 
analyses to be done outside biocontainment. 
(3) Geological materials: Sterilization by either heat or gamma irradiation will 
irreversibly damage samples produced by low temperature surface and near-
surface processes on Mars and render them unsuitable for the required analytical 
investigations. This includes materials containing volatile-rich minerals and 
amorphous materials. Hence for investigations of habitability-related (low 
temperature of formation/modification, surface/near-surface) geological materials, 
both dry heat sterilization and gamma irradiation should be avoided. 
(4) Gas samples: Some gaseous species that science would want to measure in the gas 
samples may be sensitive to dry heat or gamma irradiation, but the noble gases are 
































































































































































































































































































































expected to be sterilization tolerant. It may be possible to render gas samples 
sterile via filtration through an inert grid to allow them to be analyzed outside 
biocontainment. 
Potential alternative sterilization techniques identified by Velbel et al. (2021) and 
noted above might allow some investigations to be conducted outside biocontainment. 
These include sterilization of liquid extracts by solvent extraction and acid hydrolysis, 
which could allow organic materials to be characterized outside biocontainment without 
heat or gamma irradiation sterilization (see Velbel et al., 2021 Section 2.3 for more 
information). It may also be possible to filter gas samples by means of filtration through an 
inert mesh (see Velbel et al., 2021, Section 6.4) with nanometer-size openings. Both 
techniques should be studied further to determine whether these sterilization methods 
would be acceptable to both science and planetary protection stakeholders. 
2.2.3.1 Implications for SRF capabilities 
A number of sterilization-sensitive sample attributes have been identified by Velbel et 
al. (2021), but several of these are neither time-sensitive nor necessary for completing the 
SSAP. Because the intention is to propose requirements for a minimalist SRF, the baseline 
plan proposed herein includes only the capabilities needed to complete the SSAP, as these 
will be required to determine whether the samples contain martian biological organisms, 
as well as to carry out the measurements deemed time-sensitive. Other sterilization-
sensitive investigations can be deferred until the samples have been evaluated via the 
SSAP and, presumably, deemed safe for release (Figure 4). If the results indicate the 
presence of a potential biohazard or if the results are ambiguous, the SRF should have the 
capability to allow instruments to be added later (Figure 4). This will be especially 
important if martian life is discovered; scientists would certainly want to perform a 
number of investigations related to characterizing and understanding that life, and the 
public and government sponsors would be equally invested in making the most of such a 
historic discovery. This does not necessarily mean that the SRF itself would have to 
expanded or that instruments would have to be brought into the existing building. This 
could potentially be implemented with a second structure at the same site or even a new 
or modified building at a different site. 
































































































































































































































































































































In response to the above considerations, Velbel et al. (2021) presented the following 
four goals for sample analysis inside the SRF: 
(1) Characterize sample tube headspace gas composition; 
(2) Detect organic biosignatures of extant and past/extinct life & characterize organic 
material of potential biological origin (including volatile hydrocarbons); 
(3) Measurements of paleoenvironment and paleo-habitability indicators, potential 
biosignature preservation indicators, and potential physical and inorganic-chemical 
biosignatures; Characterize solid-phase hosts of volatiles; 
(4) Characterize mineral- and other solid-phase (amorphous material)-bound volatiles. 
The traceability matrix and the reference instrument types relevant to achieving these 
four goals for sample analysis have been incorporated into the integrated instrument list 
and can be viewed in Supplement 2 of this report. 
Several recommendations for capabilities needed within the SRF to support 
measurement of sterilization-sensitive sample attributes include the following: 
(1) The SRF should have the capability to allow instruments to be added at a later date 
to allow investigations of other sterilization-sensitive attributes if it is not possible 
to release unsterilized samples from the SRF. This capability would presumably be 
needed in any case to replace or repair damaged instruments. 
(2) Because all samples are altered to some degree by heat or gamma irradiation 
sterilization, the heat and gamma-ray sterilization chambers in the SRF should be 
able to monitor weight loss and the chemical and stable isotopic compositions of 
carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and sulfur, and the abundance of phosphorus 
and other volatiles released during the sterilization step for all samples to 
characterize and fully document any sterilization-induced alteration. 
(3) The SRF should have the capability to implement alternative sterilization 
techniques such as acid hydrolysis and gas filtration if they can be determined to be 
acceptable to both science and for planetary protection. 
  
































































































































































































































































































































2.2.4 Sample Safety Assessment Protocol 
Article IX of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty governs the principles and activities 
of space exploration to include preventing the “harmful contamination and also adverse 
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial 
matter.” Planetary protection policies and implementation standards developed by NASA 
and ESA must remain consistent with COSPAR guidelines. To that end, the COSPAR Bureau 
has established a Sample Safety Assessment Protocol Working Group (SSAP-WG) to review 
and update safety assessments related to transporting, storing, and analyzing unsterilized 
material from Mars after landing on Earth that had been previously described in the Draft 
Test Protocol (Rummel et al., 2002). The SSAP-WG includes individuals with relevant 
expertise in life detection, biohazard analysis, public health, infectious diseases, physical 
and chemical characteristics of martian surface materials, extraterrestrial sample curation, 
statistical analysis, and high-level biological containment. Membership includes 
international representatives of the science community, members of advisory groups to 
regulatory agencies, space agencies, and other interested parties. An SRF would need to 
meet all relevant planetary protection requirements intended to prevent inadvertent 
contamination of Earth’s biosphere, including biosafety containment of all martian 
material until it has been determined to be non-hazardous or rendered so by sterilization 
(Pratt and Smith, 2020). 
The SSAP will be limited to the assessment of indications of martian life, extant or 
recently deceased, in any martian material and spacecraft hardware exposed to martian 
material. The scope of the SSAP is focused on any risk to Earth from “replicating biological 
entities,” a feature consistent with reports from the NRC-SSB and ESF-ESSC reports 
(National Research Council 2009; Ammann et al., 2012). The evaluation of martian 
material for potential hazards should focus exclusively on searching for evidence of living 
organisms, their resting states, or their remains (if recently deceased). If evidence of 
martian life or recent remains are detected, it would be highly unlikely that this life could 
be determined reliably as either harmful or harmless to Earth, or to prove that all life was 
in fact deceased, even if it is exhaustively characterized (e.g., by sequencing, cultivation,  
 
































































































































































































































































































































and biochemical analysis). This is problematic even for terrestrial biological agents, and 
most of the time limited to very narrow test cases for public health. 
Hence the overall scope of the SSAP test sequence, and downstream decision criteria 
for success, are essential components to understanding the presence of extinct or extant 
martian life in the returned samples. For the sample safety assessment, each sample tube 
is considered a separate sample. A negative result in one tube cannot necessarily be 
applied to all tubes. Information gained in analyzing individual tubes will inform 
subsequent analysis of other tubes. The elements of the SSAP shall be built on Bayesian 
analysis, subsampling, a defined test sequence, and peer-reviewed decision criteria. 
Additional information can be found in the SSAP Working Group Final Report (see Kminek 
et al., 2021). 
To mitigate any unnecessary bias introduced during the updated SSAP, there is a need 
to apply analytical methods that do not presuppose knowledge of the characteristics of an 
extraterrestrial life form (agnostic approaches) to samples that may have unprecedented 
chemical complexity. Additionally, leveraging two or more complementary agnostic life 
detection approaches would also be critical. Each sample tube needs to be scanned by XCT 
(X-ray Computed Tomography) and correlated chemical mapping early in the process, and 
dedicated analytical developments are necessary to establish sensitivity and specificity of 
each science investigation used in the SSAP evaluation and of the integrated sequence. 
2.2.4.1 Implications for SRF capabilities 
The SRF capabilities associated with the SSAP should include all instrumentation and 
infrastructure necessary to carry out the test sequence. Based on preliminary information 
received from the SSAP-WG, MSPG2 has inferred the following necessary capabilities: 
(1) Instrumentation to conduct physical sample characterization of the sample at a 
spatial resolution of 5–20 microns to identify surfaces, veins, and void spaces 
connected to an exterior surface. This can be done on a sample still inside the tube; 
(2) Instrumentation necessary for head gas sampling from sample tubes; 
  
































































































































































































































































































































(3) Tools and infrastructure to support sample preparation for solvent extraction using 
acid hydrolysis. This technique can be used for internal analysis within SRF or, 
potentially, to sterilize samples for release outside the SRF; 
(4) Instrumentation to interrogate sample textures and associated chemistries through 
high-resolution spatial and spectroscopic analysis of free surfaces and cracks/veins. 
The spatial resolution for morphological and associated chemical mapping shall be 
sub-micrometer in size; 
(5) Instrumentation for organics analysis by high-resolution chemical imaging sample 
analysis and bulk sample analysis; 
(6) Instrumentation to analyze molecular patterns and capture information about 
isomers and enantiomers in multiple compound classes (e.g., amino acids, lipids, 
bases, or compounds that could serve analogous biological functions in potential 
martian organisms); 
(7) Instrumentation to identify macromolecules and capture information about 
polymers (e.g., peptides, nucleic acids, saccharides, or compounds that could serve 
analogous biological functions in potential martian organisms); 
(8) Instrumentation to detect terrestrial life or “life as we know it.” This step requires 
amplification or sub culturing in conditions suitable for propagating terrestrial 
biology; 
(9) Infrastructure to render samples non-hazardous by means of sterilization or other 
means. 
Ultimately, the SSAP will focus exclusively on risk associated with a putative replicating 
biological entity. Reference instruments needed to accomplish the above test sequence 
have been proposed by the MSPG2 SRF Focus Group and reviewed by members of the 
SSAP-WG. These reference instruments should not be assumed to be the final instruments 
that will be installed in the SRF, but rather serve as a guideline for cost and engineering 
estimates. These reference instrument types appear in Supplement 2 of this report. The 
final report from the SSAP will provide input to design considerations for the SRF by  
 
































































































































































































































































































































further refining the types of preparative processes and analytical instruments needed to 
search for evidence of extant life in the returned martian samples. 
2.2.5 Sample processing, preparation, and storage 
To carry out the activities and investigations described above and allow for effective 
preparation of subsamples for investigations both inside and outside the SRF, it would 
need to contain a variety of sample processing and preparation capabilities. This includes 
capabilities needed to divide samples into subsamples as well as manipulate and prepare 
small particles and larger subsamples with strict contamination control protocols. To 
prepare samples for various analyses would require an array of laboratory capabilities for 
sample preparation that include: 
(1) Dry wire saws, equipment for powdering, grinding, polishing, and coating samples; 
(2) Wet chemistry facilities and equipment to perform solvent extraction and 
derivatization; 
(3) Microbiological laboratory functionalities that include capabilities related to 
biological sample preparation, refrigerators, and freezers; 
(4) Capability to clean and sterilize small tools and equipment that will come in contact 
with the samples; 
(5) Gas extraction and handling capabilities (see Section 2.2.6). 
More information on sample prep capabilities can be found in Appendices B, D, and E. 
The samples would also need to be stored under conditions that protect them from 
contamination and environmental extremes as described in Section 2.1 and Supplement 1. 
2.2.6 Considerations for gas retrieval and analysis 
Capabilities related to gas extraction and analysis have been identified by three MSPG2 
focus groups, with many requiring further work to define the optimal methods for 
retrieving and analyzing these samples. This process will begin with the need to extract 
and capture the gas behind each sealed layer of the spacecraft for analysis. It would also 
be beneficial to determine the pressure inside these sealed areas prior to gas extraction, if 
possible. At the time of writing there is expected to be only one hermetic seal external to 
































































































































































































































































































































the sample tubes, which is that of the primary containment vessel (PCV) that encapsulates 
the Orbiting Sample container (OS). The pressure and composition of this gas could be 
used to determine whether the seal(s) has leaked and to what degree terrestrial 
atmosphere and potential contamination have been introduced into the OS and 
potentially into the sample tubes. 
Once the gas exterior to the sample tubes has been extracted and the OS has been 
opened, the next steps would relate to the gas inside each sample tube. Ideally, we would 
like to be able to measure the leak rate of each sample tube as soon as possible after its 
removal from the OS. The “best” samples for some science investigations will be those 
with the lowest leak rates, and this will need to be documented as part of the sample 
catalog (Tait et al., 2021 Section 3.2.2). If a method to do this could be designed that 
would not disturb the gas or solid sample inside the tube then this scenario would be 
favored, but this could very likely be impossible. Traditional methods for measuring leak 
rates (e.g., He leak rate tests) require accessing both sides of a seal. It may be necessary to 
wait to test the seal leak rate after gas has been extracted and the sample has been 
removed from the tube. 
It is not advisable to remove the headspace gas from all the tubes prior to the point at 
which the sample will be extracted, as the sample will begin to undergo alteration once it 
is removed from its equilibrium with the headspace gas in each tube. This essentially 
“starts the clock” for many of the time-sensitive measurements, so the headspace gas 
should remain undisturbed until shortly before the solid sample is removed from the tube. 
Because the gas will not be extracted immediately, each tube should be placed in an 
individual sample tube isolation container (STIC) that incorporates the capability to allow 
for periodic extraction (and subsequent analysis) of gases that may be leaking from the 
sample tube into the secondary container. This would have benefits for both 
understanding the seal leak rate and for monitoring volatiles that have degassed from the 
solid samples into the gas phase (Tait et al., Section 3.2.3; Tosca et al., 2021, Section 6.1). 
Once a sample tube is selected to be opened, the headspace gas will need to be 
extracted and transferred, in an unaltered, unfractionated state, to one or several sample 
































































































































































































































































































































vessels that could then be stored or transferred for analysis outside the SRF. These vessels 
would need to be designed to accommodate potential sterilization of the gas samples by 
heat or gamma irradiation, including selecting and preparing the containers in such a way 
as to minimize contamination or alteration of the sample during sterilization. Of particular 
concern are the potential degassing of terrestrial atmospheric contaminants from the 
vessel walls and the triggering of chemical reactions between the vessel walls and gaseous 
molecules. Interactions between vessel walls and gas could be minimized, at least in the 
case of noble gases, if the containers were baked and degassed sufficiently, for example to 
a few hundreds of degrees Celsius for a few days prior to use (Velbel et al., 2021 Section 
6.2). 
The method and apparatus used to extract and transfer the gas into these vessels will 
require significant further work. The sample tubes do not have a valve or port that can be 
used for gas extraction, so the tube will have to be penetrated by a yet-to-be-designed 
apparatus that will collect the headspace gas. There are several important considerations 
that must be factored into this process including (1) the need to collect ALL of the 
headspace gas, as this is a very small volume of material, every molecule that can be 
collected is important for science and any incomplete collection may cause fractionation, 
(2) this extraction needs to be performed without introducing terrestrial gaseous 
contamination into the gas samples or the sample tubes, (3) the extraction processes must 
not introduce contamination into the sample tubes and compromise the pristine nature of 
the solid samples, which means that the materials used in the extraction system may need 
to be limited to the materials that are permitted to contact pristine samples. It is highly 
recommended that a team comprised of engineers, curators, and scientists is formed to 
address the development of the gas extraction system. 
Capabilities for gas sample analysis inside the SRF are primarily driven by the need to 
understand whether the gas has been subject to terrestrial contamination, and to what 
degree, and potentially to what degree martian gas has escaped from the sample tubes 
into the OS. This will inform which gas samples (and related solid samples) are appropriate 
for scientific analyses based on their relative degree of contamination. Two types of 
instruments have been recommended for these analyses (Supplement 2, Table C-1, rows 
































































































































































































































































































































23 and 24). A final decision on the suitability of a specific set of instrumentation to analyze 
the low volume and molar quantities expected should be made later, as the relevant 
techniques are rapidly evolving, particularly in the area of optical laser spectroscopy. 
It is anticipated that many measurements of noble gas species in the gas samples could 
be performed on heat-sterilized samples outside biocontainment, but this would alter 
other gas species, and so it would only be appropriate if the subsample were used only for 
noble gas measurements. Gamma irradiation may also be acceptable for noble gas 
measurements of subsamples, but this would need to be verified through further 
experimentation and analyses. Other volatile species are likely to be affected to a greater 
or lesser extent by either heat or gamma irradiation sterilization processes. There is 
significant work to be done to better understand the effects of traditional sterilization 
techniques on these types of samples. Another potential sterilization method for gas 
samples would be sterilization by filtration. Theoretically, a gas sample could be passed 
through a grid composed of an inert material with a low outgassing rate and a pore size 
small enough to effectively remove any particles large enough to be of concern as a 
potential biohazard. More work needs to be done to determine whether this would be an 
acceptable alternative, both from the planetary protection and science perspectives. 
Experiments are needed to investigate possible adsorption/desorption effects that could 
compromise the samples’ composition (desorption of terrestrial gases, adsorption and 
fractionation of martian gas, kinetics of filtering) (Velbel et al., 2021, Section 6.2). 
Please see Section 5 of this report for a list of open questions and areas of future work 
related to the extraction and analysis of returned martian gas samples. 
2.2.7 Planning for analytical instrumentation in the SRF 
2.2.7.1  Required capabilities and reference instruments 
Based on analysis of reports by Kminek et al. (2021), Tait et al. (2021), Tosca et al. 
(2021), and Velbel et al. (2021), as described above, we conclude that for the SRF to meet 
its primary objectives, it should have the analytical capabilities needed to carry out the 
following: 
































































































































































































































































































































(1) The initial sample characterization (including Pre-BC, BC, and PE), development of 
the sample catalog, and preparation of the samples for allocation and scientific 
investigations, 
(2) Science investigations necessary to complete the SSAP, 
(3) Certain science investigations that are both time- and sterilization-sensitive. 
To successfully carry out the above, the SRF would also need to include the capability 
to: 
(a) Maintain strict contamination control and contamination knowledge 
protocols, including capabilities for monitoring and cleaning large and small 
equipment and instruments, 
(b) Enable multiple sample preparation and processing capabilities, 
(c) Accommodate isolators and gloveboxes for sample processing. 
The MSPG2 focus groups and SSAP-WG have identified the range of sample properties 
that would need to be measured inside the SRF to accomplish the objectives noted above, 
and these have been used to develop the proposed SRF Design Requirements presented in 
Supplement 1. These requirements are phrased in terms of the capability to measure 
certain sample properties rather than requirements to provide specific instruments. This is 
in keeping with our technical approach, described in Section 1.4, to provide capability-
driven requirements and leave implementation options open for further investigation. It is 
expected that at least some of the instruments chosen for use inside the SRF will be 
selected through a future competitive process (Haltigin et al., 2021), and the detailed 
performance specifications of these instruments (e.g., required spatial resolution, specific 
wavelengths to be used for optical methods, etc.) will need to be determined by a future 
planning group such as a Measurement Definition Team (MDT) or an Operations and 
Requirements Definition Team (ORDT, see MSPG, 2019c). 
Although the specific instruments that will be installed in the SRF cannot be 
determined at this time, we acknowledge that the engineers and architects are beginning 
accommodation and trade studies related to SRF planning, and these studies would 
































































































































































































































































































































benefit from having more information regarding the estimated number of instruments and 
approximate information about size, power, thermal, interfaces, and associated sample 
preparation needs related to those instruments. To aid in this process, we have chosen to 
present what we are calling “reference instruments” that represent instruments that are 
currently being used by the science community to make the types of measurements that 
have been identified by MSPG2 and the SSAP-WG. In doing so, we are specifically not 
endorsing specific models or manufacturers of these instruments; we are fully supportive 
of future competitive processes. 
To produce the list of reference instruments, each MSPG2 focus group prepared an 
instrument traceability matrix (Supplement 2) in which their measurement goals are 
matched with known instrument types that could be used to make those measurements. 
The lists of instrument types were compiled and evaluated for overlap between the three 
focus groups and with the instrument list provided by the SSAP-WG, and this was used to 
generate a summary list of instrument types (Supplement 2, Table C-1). In summary, we 
propose a list of ~20–30 instruments, most of which are benchtop-sized instruments. 
These instruments, and their associated sample preparation needs, would be necessary 
and sufficient to enable the initial sample characterization, the science investigations 
necessary for the SSAP, and certain time- and sterilization-sensitive science investigations 
that cannot be conducted outside the SRF. Reference instruments and their associated 
sample preparation needs have been compiled in Supplement 3. 
FINDING SRF-2: Although most MSR sample investigations would take place outside of the 
SRF, the SRF needs to include significant laboratory capabilities with advanced instruments 
and associated sample preparation systems to enable the MSR science objectives to be 
successfully achieved. 
2.2.7.2 Additional considerations for instrumentation planning 
Further considerations related to instrumentation planning have to do with timing and 
contingency planning for managing risks related to scheduling and the inability to acquire 
information needed to manage and analyze the samples. Instruments can break down and 
they will require routine maintenance and recalibration, etc. In addition, placing 
































































































































































































































































































































complicated instruments behind the barrier in a BSL-4-grade containment facility would 
severely restrict access to service technicians and service equipment (e.g., oscilloscopes, 
He leak detectors). Thus, it may be too simplistic to assume that, for each measurement 
needed, exactly one instrument is sufficient to generate the data. The probability and 
consequences of instrument failure and the need for repair, replacement, or instrument 
redundancy should be carefully considered by a future planning team, and appropriate 
contingency plans would need to be developed. 
Timing is also an important aspect related to the scope of operation of the SRF. At 
some point, there would need to be stakeholder-set objectives related to how quickly the 
MSR samples need to be processed through the SRF and made available for scientific 
investigation outside of biocontainment (potentially including by sterilization). There are 
several potential operational scenarios that would result in smaller or larger SRF footprints 
and different timelines for sample processing. For example, a facility with fewer isolators 
would likely result in a smaller footprint (and lower cost) but would also be constrained to 
operate at a slower pace. MSPG2 determined that it did not have enough information to 
make a single recommendation on this topic at this time, as there are many variables to be 
considered including various possible operational scenarios for the SRF and stakeholder 
priorities related to budget and schedule. The implications of this trade-off are significant, 
and they need to be studied carefully once there is an indication of the potential budget 
for the SRF and relative priorities of the MSR-sponsoring agencies are known. 
FINDING SRF-3: Preliminary studies of different operational scenarios should be started as 
soon as possible to enable analysis of the trade-offs between the cost and size of the SRF 
and the amount of time needed to prepare the samples for allocation and analysis. 
It is important to note that the planning described above is for a minimalist facility, 
based on the contingency that no martian biohazards are present in the samples. In this 
scenario, it is assumed that unsterilized samples would be able to be transferred to 
uncontained facilities after they have been determined to be non-hazardous. The 
instruments in the SRF would be a small subset of all the instruments that would 
eventually be applied to the samples. However, in the unlikely scenario where martian life 
































































































































































































































































































































or a non-living biohazard is discovered, at least some unsterilized samples would need to 
stay in the SRF indefinitely, and a somewhat broader set of instrumentation would need to 
be brought to bear. If prepared samples for sterilization-sensitive science cannot be 
released to outside laboratories in an unsterilized state, then the analytical functionalities 
(instruments) that make these measurements would be needed inside biocontainment. 
Therefore, the capability to allow for adding additional capabilities at a later date would be 
needed, whether inside the SRF or in ancillary biocontained laboratories, in order to 
perform additional sterilization-sensitive measurements that are not part of the current 
baseline set of analyses. Preliminary planning by Velbel et al. (2021) has identified four 
instrument types that would form the basis of these investigations (Supplement 2, page 
S2-4). Additional science investigations and measurements would also be needed to 
further characterize the putative martian life, if detected, but preliminary discussions on 
this topic suggest that these investigations and measurements would not require 
significant additional capabilities above what has already been recommended. 
FINDING SRF-4: The ability to add additional analytical capabilities within biocontainment 
should be preserved to address the contingency scenario in which unsterilized material is 
not cleared to be analyzed outside of biocontainment. If potential evidence of martian life 
were to be detected in the samples, for example, it would be a high priority to conduct 
further investigations related to any putative lifeforms, as well as to enable other 
sterilization-sensitive science investigations to be conducted in biocontainment. 
3. Other SRF Capabilities 
Beyond the scientific capabilities outlined above, there are myriad building and 
engineering requirements needed to complete the design of the SRF and thus support the 
overall science goals of MSR. The specifics of these requirements are outside the expertise 
of MSPG2 members and are thus incomplete in their identification in the proposed SRF 
Design Requirements table and in the discussion sections below. The building and 
engineering requirements needed to complete the design of the SRF should be addressed 
by the SRF implementation team and subsequent building contractors. 
 
































































































































































































































































































































 Overall biocontainment building engineering and infrastructure 3.1
The SRF is a critical component needed to enable the MSR Campaign to meet the 
stringent backward planetary protection and contamination control requirements for 
reliable sample intake, biocontainment, and curation. To date, only planning and trade-off 
studies have been implemented regarding a notional SRF. Preliminary drivers for 
requirements are based on the SRF configuration, scientific requirements, and 
biocontainment level needed to protect Earth’s biosphere and cleanliness needed to 
preserve the science value of the MSR samples. Current draft requirements state that 
samples returned from Mars would be placed in BSL-4 equivalent containment until they 
are deemed safe to be released to outside laboratories, either by analysis or by 
sterilization. BSL-4 laboratories require specialized design requirements that are outlined 
in the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) publication 
authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services et al., 2020). 
BSL-4 laboratories are typically high-containment facilities with a high degree of 
redundancy built into the design of their complex air handling systems and liquid effluent 
decontamination and removal systems. They have data storage and processing and 
electrical power options that could sustain safe operations during a total loss of power, 
and they have security measures that consist of physical and technical capabilities. These 
buildings would typically have supporting lower-level laboratories (BSL-3 and BSL-2) that 
aid in supplemental research functions. 
For the SRF, planning activities indicate that the facility would need to accommodate 
separate rooms for control/administration, support labs (e.g., BSL-2 or -3), auxiliary space 
(e.g., outer change, entry anteroom, shower room, inner change room, mechanical), as 
well as the actual BSL-4 high-containment space (e.g., suit labs and/or ultra-clean isolator 
labs). 
3.1.1 Capabilities requirements 
Draft Level 1 requirements for the SRF indicate that it should be engineered to support 
the facility and infrastructure needs for a high-value scientific research and curation facility 
































































































































































































































































































































(Supplement 1). In addition to the laboratory space, in and out of biocontainment, the SRF 
would need to host administrative support space, conference rooms, training labs, and 
classrooms. While there are no standard layouts or design requirements for a high-
containment laboratory, there are several requirements for negative and positive pressure 
regimes and directional airflow to ensure laboratory pathogens remain contained. For the 
SRF, in addition to the standard BMBL air pressure requirements and HVAC controls, the 
following draft requirements were noted, including several for uncontained spaces: 
(1) Physical security 
(2) IT infrastructure for data sharing and information security internally and externally 
(3) Office space for permanent staff, including administrative staff 
(4) Office space for guest staff, including visiting scientists, regulatory personnel, public 
engagement 
(5) Biocontainment training laboratories (for suit labs or BSL-4 suit labs or cabinet labs) 
in non-containment spaces for all personnel working in biocontainment spaces 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services et al., 2020) 
(6) Capability to engage observers outside the biocontainment lab both locally (in 
person) and remotely 
(7) Capability to host international investigators 
 Spacecraft receiving and de-integration 3.2
Current planning calls for the samples to be encapsulated within their individual 
sample tubes; in the engineering terminology, these are referred to as Returnable Sample 
Tube Assemblies (RSTAs). Each RSTA will have a “plug” with very tight sealing properties, 
and these seals will have been established using the capping station of M2020. In the 
current baseline plan, the collective set of sample tubes, along with any associated witness 
tubes (in engineering terminology, the Witness Tube Assemblies, or WTAs), will then be 
loaded into a capsule (referred to as the Orbiting Sample container, or OS), which will have 
a closable lid that is currently planned to be dust-tight, but not air-tight. The OS will be 
lifted to Mars orbit, where it will be captured by the Earth Return Orbiter (ERO). Within 
































































































































































































































































































































ERO, the OS will be transferred into the Earth Entry System (or EES), and as part of that, 
two additional seals will be established around the OS: The Primary Containment Vessel 
(or PCV) and the Secondary Containment Vessel (or SCV). Once everything is configured 
properly, the EES will be set on an Earth return trajectory and land at an approved landing 
site on Earth’s surface (one site under consideration is the Utah Test and Training Range in 
Utah, USA). 
A ground recovery team will access the landing site as soon as possible after the 
landing, and current planning is for them to establish an additional seal around the 
entirety of the returned spacecraft. It is expected that transportation to the SRF will 
happen in this state. With regard to the SRF, therefore, the final delivery of the spacecraft 
is presumed to be by truck, which means the SRF will have to have some sort of a loading 
dock. Planning for how to transition from a loading dock environment to the clean, 
biocontained interior of the SRF will entail significant complexity. 
When the samples arrive at the SRF, they would be surrounded by at least 5 layers of 
seals (RSTA, OS, PCV, SCV, field seal at Earth landing site), each with different attributes. 
There would be an interest in knowing the state of each seal as soon as possible. Two 
additional considerations are important as follows: 
(1) The surfaces associated with the innermost seals would be Mars-dirty and Earth-
clean, and this aspect will reverse as we get to outer seals. For example, since the 
EES will land on soil/mud somewhere on Earth, its outside surface will certainly be 
heavily Earth-contaminated. As these seals are opened, there would be a need to 
“break the chain of contact,” so that the Earth-clean interiors are opened into 
Earth-clean environments within the SRF. 
(2) Some of these seals (especially PCV and SCV) would be intimately integrated into 
the EES. Thus, gaining access to these seals and getting them open requires a de-
integration of the entire returned spacecraft. There is also a desire to capture the 
gas behind all gas-tight seals between the spacecraft exterior and the RSTAs (at the 
time of writing this is expected to be limited to the seal on the PCV). 
  
































































































































































































































































































































Based on the findings of Grady et al. (2021) and extensively commented on by Tait et 
al. (2021), the adventitious dust on the interior surfaces within the PCV that have been 
exposed to the martian environment is considered to be valuable scientifically, and the SRF 
needs to include the capability to capture and preserve it. This most directly applies to the 
outside surfaces of the sample tubes that have been cached on the martian surface. 
Because of their possibly long exposure time, they may have significant quantities of dust. 
Even though the OS would be open to the martian environment for a much shorter period 
of time, its interior may also contain significant dust that has been transferred there by the 
sample tubes. For all surfaces outward of the outer surface of the OS, there would be 
engineering efforts to reduce or eliminate the dust, so the usefulness of that material to 
scientific research would be greatly reduced. 
 Planetary Protection: Sterilization 3.3
The SRF needs to have the capability to sterilize subsamples to allow for analyses to be 
conducted outside the SRF prior to completion of the SSAP and when it is not possible to 
conduct the analyses with the subsample in a Planetary Protection-compliant sample 
holder. Two methods currently under consideration are sterilization by dry-heat (180°C for 
3h or 250°C for 30min) or by gamma irradiation (1 MGy dosage). It should be noted that it 
may take up to 2-3 weeks of continuous exposure to a Co-60 source to achieve a 1 MGy 
dose. Other alternative sterilization methods for certain sample types have been 
considered, such as gas filtration or acid hydrolysis of sample extracts. In any case, it would 
be recommended in the future to conduct analogue experiments to assess the impact of 
the various sterilization methods on sample properties as a way to propose a protocol to 
those authorities charged with making planetary protection-related decisions. 
The SRF should have the capability to sterilize tools or specific pieces of equipment as 
part of a cleaning cycle to reduce cross-contamination between samples, and also in case 
the equipment needs to be taken outside of biocontainment. The sterilization protocols 
would need to be efficient against unknown pathogens, while maintaining the equipment 
integrity. 
  
































































































































































































































































































































In terms of footprint, gamma irradiation should be the only method that requires 
significant infrastructure to host a source. Other methods are usually achieved with 
smaller equipment. Gamma irradiation was also found by Velbel et al. (2021) to be a 
preferred sterilization modality for some sample attributes, allowing some measurements 
to be done outside biocontainment that would otherwise need to be accommodated 
inside biocontainment if only heat-based sterilization were used. For these reasons, we 
recommend gamma irradiation be investigated for its potential use in the SRF to reach a 
consensus early in the SRF design process on its acceptability as a sterilization method for 
planetary protection. 
 Sample prep/packaging/shipping 3.4
To efficiently transfer subsamples to external facilities and laboratories, the SRF will 
need to have the capability to prepare and ship subsamples. This would include the 
capabilities to ship both sterilized (or subsamples otherwise deemed nonhazardous) to 
uncontained facilities, as well as the capability to transfer samples or subsamples in 
planetary protection-compliant BSL-4 contained conditions. Biocontained samples may 
need to be transferred to other biocontained facilities or transferred to a facility in which 
they could be examined while in their BSL-4 containers (e.g., a synchrotron facility). Areas 
in which samples are packaged would need to follow the same environmental and 
contamination requirements as other laboratory spaces inside the SRF to preserve the 
science value of the sample or subsample to be transferred. 
4. Discussion 
The analysis and findings in this report lead to several significant implications regarding 
the design of the SRF. Most, or all, of these are consistent with findings from prior studies, 
and they are listed here for completeness. 
Implication #1: The samples’ initial state will be virtually free of terrestrial 
contamination, and almost everything that is done to them will cause irreversible 
contamination. A significant amount of SRF infrastructure will be necessary to maintain 
and monitor appropriate levels of cleanliness, including capability to perform precision  
 
































































































































































































































































































































cleaning, monitoring of airflow and various types of contamination, production of 
ultrapure water and solvents, and equipment sterilization. (Section 2.1.2). 
Implication #2: Throughout the facility, there should be a capability to control and 
monitor temperature and temperature fluctuations as well as the humidity and 
composition of atmospheric gas. There should also be a capability to maintain an 
environment without strong magnetic fields (<0.5 mT) in all settings to which the samples 
are exposed. (Section 2.1.1). 
Implication #3: Although most MSR sample analyses will take place outside the SRF, 
the objectives listed above in Section 1.3.1 imply that the SRF will need to include a 
significant laboratory complex with advanced instruments and associated sample 
preparation systems. This will have implications for room sizing and configuration, as well 
as required utilities (power, gas lines, vacuum systems, etc.). In addition, many of the 
reference instruments identified by MSPG2 are currently incompatible with operation 
inside isolation cabinets; this implies that some aspects of the SRF could need to be 
operated as a biosafety suit lab. 
Implication #4: The SRF concept described by MSPG2 is meant to minimize the amount 
of biocontained space needed and maximize the number of measurements that take place 
outside the SRF. If SSAP related investigations indicate the potential presence of martian 
life, this could prevent the release of unsterilized material for examination outside of 
biocontainment. This would necessitate additional analytical capability inside 
biocontainment to allow for further examination of putative martian lifeforms, which 
would be a very high priority, and allow other sterilization-sensitive investigations to be 
carried out. This does not necessarily mean that the initial SRF building must be expanded. 
This could potentially be implemented with a second building at the same site or a new or 
modified building at a different site (Section 2.2.3). 
Implication #5: An important aspect related to the design and operation of the SRF is 
timing. Preliminary studies of different operational scenarios should be started as soon as 
possible to enable analysis of the trade-offs between the cost and size of the SRF and the 
amount of time it will take to prepare the samples for allocation and analysis. More 
































































































































































































































































































































advanced studies should be conducted once the budget and priorities for the SRF have 
been established by NASA and ESA. 
The various activities that should be accommodated within the SRF for the MSR 
science objectives to be achieved is graphically illustrated in Figure 5. 
5. Recommendations for Future Work 
There have been several areas identified that will require refinement either by future 
planning groups or via further analysis: 
 Evaluate potential strategies related to instrument redundancy or the capabilities 
related to replacing instruments. 
 Advance requirements related to environmental and contamination requirements 
and the monitoring of: 
o Allowable humidity, 
o Type of allowable gas under which to store samples and acceptable purity 
levels for same, 
o Organic contamination requirement levels, 
o Biological contamination requirement levels, 
o Inorganic contamination requirement levels, 
o Particulate contamination requirement levels. 
 Development of a contamination control and knowledge plan. 
 More complete definition of what is needed in various sample prep laboratories. 
 Further development of approaches, techniques, and requirements related to the 
extraction, storage, sterilization, and analysis of martian headspace gas samples. 
 Elaboration of instrument specifications needed to eventually produce an 
Announcement of Opportunity (AO) to solicit those instruments or to allow direct 
procurement of facility provided instruments. 
  
































































































































































































































































































































 Evaluation of alternative sterilization techniques such as solvent extraction/acid 
hydrolysis or filtration- conduct analogue experiments to assess the impact of the 
various sterilization methods on sample properties, and as a way to propose a 
protocol to authorities competent on Planetary Protection. 
 Investigation of potential strategies for storing and analyzing soil collected from 
area surrounding the EES landing site. 
 Timing is an important aspect related to the design and operation of the SRF. We 
recommend conducting an evaluation of the trade-offs between the cost and size 
of the SRF and the amount of time it will take to prepare the samples for allocation 
and analysis. A smaller facility with fewer isolators for parallel processing than 
recommended by Tait et al. (2021) (i.e., Section 2.2.1) would likely result in a 
smaller footprint for the SRF, as well as a slower pace for the initial sample 
characterization, production of the sample catalog, completion of the SSAP, and 
other analyses, as well as a delay in sample allocation to external laboratories. This 
could also impact the time-sensitive science investigations that could be 
successfully conducted within the SRF. This would presumably also result in a 
higher lifetime operating cost for the SRF. We recommend that these trades be 
studied carefully once there is an indication of the potential budget for the SRF and 
relative priorities of the agencies (i.e., NASA and ESA) are known. 
 Evaluate the possibility of using robotics and remote manipulation systems both 
inside and outside isolators. Further work should be done to evaluate the possible 
uses of robotics and remote manipulator systems, and the benefits of these 
systems to reduce contaminations risks related to pressure systems and suit labs. 
 Address open questions related to gas extraction and analysis, including: 
o Is it possible to test the RSTA seal leak rate without extracting the 
headspace gas first? 
 If so, this would have the benefit of not “starting the clock” on the 
time-sensitive processes that begin to alter the sample once it is no 
longer in equilibrium with its headspace gas 
































































































































































































































































































































o How to extract the headspace gas from each sample tube while: 
 retrieving all of the gas present in the tube? 
 not contaminating the solid samples, keeping them as pristine as 
possible? 
 Need to know the allowable materials 
 not contaminating the gas? 
 The CC requirements for gas samples still need to be 
determined. 
 not fractionating the gas (i.e., preserving its isotopic composition)? 
o Will it be acceptable (for backward PP) to filter gas through nm scale mesh and 
analyze outside biocontainment? 
o Will it be acceptable (in terms of sample quality) to filter gas through nm scale 
mesh and analyze outside biocontainment? 
 If yes to both of the above, the only analytical capabilities needed inside 
the SRF are those sufficient to determine the level of terrestrial 
contamination. 
 If no to either of the above, greater (and difficult to implement) 
capabilities may be needed in the SRF 
 Additional work would be needed to fully determine what 
measurements are sensitive to heat or gamma irradiation 
sterilization 
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Table 1. The three stages of initial sample characterization (Tait et al., 2021). 
Stage$ Environment* Process 




 Measurements that would 
be lost or compromised 
during tube opening 
 Measurements to inform 
how the tubes are opened, 





1. Describe and remove dust 
from the exterior of the 
tubes 
2. Check tube seals (if 
possible without disturbing 
sample or headspace gas) 
3. Magnetic measurements 
4. Penetrative imaging 
Section 3 
Basic Characterization (BC): 
 Non-invasive 
measurements (should be 






1. Extraction of headspace 
gas 
2. Opening of tubes 
3. Weighing; photography 
and imaging (macro and 
micro) 
Section 4 
Preliminary Examination (PE): 
 Measurement of selected 
samples or subsamples to 
further develop the sample 
catalog and make effective 









2. Sample preparation (e.g., 
polished section; solvent 
extraction, etc.) 
3. More detailed 
measurements/analyses 
Section 5 
$Appropriate time-sensitive measurements would also be undertaken at each stage 
*Note that non-pristine environment does not imply “not clean.” Rather, it implies a 
slightly less stringent level of cleanliness and a greater number of allowable materials, and 
it requires contamination controls appropriate for the measurements to be conducted. 

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Schematic workflow of SRF activities and their relative levels of contamination 
control. 
  

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Diagram of expected workflow for initial sample characterization (modified from 
Tait et al., 2021). 
  

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Schematic illustration showing the importance of being able to carry out certain 
time-sensitive investigations before the samples can be transferred to labs outside the SRF 
(modified after MSPG, 2019a; Tosca et al., 2021).  
 

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Flow diagram describing the approach to sterilization-sensitive science. The initial 
SRF would need to accommodate initial sample characterization, science investigations 
necessary to complete the SSAP, and time-sensitive science investigations for the reasons 
described in this report. Once it is determined whether the samples are free of biohazards, 
two possible scenarios exist. If it is possible to release unsterilized samples (“YES” path in 
diagram), then all other measurements can be made outside the SRF in uncontained 
laboratories. If it is not possible to release unsterilized samples (“NO” path in diagram), 
then most of the remaining measurements can be done on sterilized samples outside 
biocontainment, but some capability will be needed for additional sterilization-sensitive 
science to be done inside biocontained laboratories. 
 

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Summary SRF Workflow Diagram. Note that everything represented inside the 
red border should be accommodated inside BSL-4 equivalent containment, with varying 
standards for contamination control. The most stringent contamination control 
requirements and materials limitations will be needed while the samples are inside 
pristine isolators. Requirements are expected to be slightly less stringent in the 
laboratories where PE and other investigations take place and least stringent when 
accessing the sealed sample tubes from the returned spacecraft. 
 
